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Theorizing the Normative Significance of
Critical Histories for International Law
Damian Cueni and Matthieu Queloz
Though recent years have seen a proliferation of critical histories of international law,
their normative significance remains under-theorized, especially from the perspective
of general readers rather than writers of such histories. How do critical histories of in-
ternational law acquire their normative significance? And how should one react to
them? We distinguish three ways in which critical histories can be normatively signifi-
cant: (i) by undermining the overt or covert conceptions of history embedded within
present practices in support of their authority; (ii) by disappointing the normative ex-
pectations that regulate people’s reactions to critical histories; and (iii) by revealing
continuities and discontinuities in the functions that our practices serve. By giving
us a theoretical grip on the different ways in which history can be normatively sig-
nificant and call for different reactions, this account helps us think about the overall
normative significance of critical histories and how one and the same critical history
can pull us in different directions.
ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
I nternational law has a history, and that history is often far from flat-tering. As the recent turn towards writing critical histories has shown,
colonial domination, racial discrimination, cultural subordination, and eco-
nomic exploitation loom large in it. But what does this tainted history mean
for international lawyers today? Do critical histories—that is, historiogra-
phy that subjects the past, and dominant narratives about the past, to critical
scrutiny1—possess any real normative significance? In other words, can criti-
1 Prominent examples of the kinds of critical histories we have in mind include Koskenniemi,
Martti.The Gentle Civilizer of Nations:The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Anghie, Antony. Imperialism, Sovereignty
and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Pitts,
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cal histories properly affect our evaluation of present-day ideas, practices, or
institutions of international law?
Critical histories can give rise to countervailing intuitions. On the one
hand, there is some plausibility to the idea that critical histories of international
law cannot possess any real normative significance; for what do the origins
of international law have to do with what it does for us now? To be sure, the
fact that international law was often used for bad ends is regrettable, but if
we are interested in what international law is today and what it can become,
why should we care about its history?2 Human rights, for example, may have
a complex and chequered history, but this does not yet tell us what attitude to
take towards them in the future—just as someonewho values the contraceptive
pill as an instrument of female emancipation might justifiably think no less of
it upon learning that its origins are entangled with the eugenics movement.3
This suggests that what matters is what things have become, not how they
originated.
But equally, there is some plausibility to the contrary idea that our un-
derstanding of international law’s tainted history can and should profoundly
inform our present evaluative attitudes. If international law has a history of
being used to buttress various forms of domination, exploitation, and sub-
ordination, then surely our evaluative attitudes cannot appropriately remain
insensitive to the realization of that fact. Presumably, it is this belief in the nor-
mative significance of historiography that animates the recent turn towards
Jennifer. A Turn to Empire:The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009); Orford, Anne. International Authority and the Responsibil-
ity to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Pahuja, Sundhya.Decolonising
International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Moyn, Samuel.The Last Utopia: Human Rights
in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Bell, Duncan. Reordering the
World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).
2 An example of such a reaction can be found in Tasioulas, John. ‘Towards a Philosophy of
Human Rights’. Current Legal Problems 65(1) (2012), 1–30, 26.
3 Watkins, Elizabeth Siegel. On the Pill: A Social History of Oral Contraceptives, 1950-1970
(London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
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writing critical histories of international law. But despite the proliferation of
critical histories of international law, their normative significance remains
under-theorized, especially from the perspective of general readers rather
than writers of such histories. How do critical histories of international law
come by their normative significance? And how should one react to them?
In this article, we theorize the normative significance of critical histories
for international law. This will allow us to articulate a range of ways in which
critical histories can be normatively significant and account for the counter-
vailing reactions they provoke. Of course, writing and thinking about critical
legal histories goes back at least to the mid-1980s.4 Here we aim to develop
a fresh perspective by drawing constructively on various tools and insights
from recent philosophical work on the significance of historiography and
genealogy to develop an audience-centred approach to critical histories.
We proceed as follows: in the next section,we situate our audience-centred
approach in relation to the extant literature and introduce the distinction that
forms the backbone of this approach: a tripartite distinction between three
different kinds of normative significance that critical histories can have in the
eyes of their readers. The three sections that follow each explore one branch
of that distinction. In the final section, we then turn to the complication
that while these three kinds of normative significance can be analytically
distinguished, they often occur together in practice, forming what we call
the overall normative significance of critical histories. But as we show, our
tripartite distinction allows us to understand how the normative significance
of one and the same critical history can pull in different directions at once
and give rise to tensions in the resulting normative assessment. What this
article hopes to achieve is to give us a grip on these tensions by theorizing
three different ways in which history can be normatively significant and call
for correspondingly different reactions on our part.
4 See, e.g., Gordon, Robert W. ‘Critical Legal Histories’. Standford Law Review 36(1/2) (1984),
57–125.
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II. Towards an Audience-Centred Approach to Critical Histories:
A Tripartite Distinction
To situate our discussion in relation to the vast literature on critical histories
of international law,5 we can start by drawing a contrast between what we
might term ‘juridical’ and ‘genealogical’ approaches to the normative signifi-
cance of critical histories for international law. Many international lawyers
understand whatever normative significance such critical histories might have
in ‘juridical’ terms, as affecting the nature and character of present-day legal
arguments. Because they rely on authoritative ‘sources’, international legal ar-
guments—like all legal arguments—are always partly oriented towards the
past.6 For that reason, a lot of methodological reflection on the normative
significance of critical histories within the discipline of international law has
centred on exploring the ways in which new understandings of the past may
be relevant to this argumentative practice of international law, broadly under-
stood. For example, Anne Orford has contrasted the contextualist style of the
Cambridge School, which situates past concepts in their own time and place,
with an approach to the past that views it as ‘a source of rationalisation of
present obligations’.7 International legal histories, she suggests, should be writ-
ten by international lawyers for international lawyers as part of present-day
legal arguments within the discipline of international law. And while most in-
ternational lawyers who write critical histories of international law thereby
aim to question the assumptions of their discipline and thus expand the range
5 See, for example, Craven, Matthew. ‘Introduction: International Law and its Histories’. In
Time,History and International Law, eds. Matthew Craven,Malgosia Fitzmaurice, andMaria
Vogiatzi (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 1–25; Skouteris, Thomas.
‘The Turn to History in International Law’.Oxford Bibliographies (2017); de la Rasilla, Ignacio.
International Law and History:Modern Interfaces (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2021).
6 Craven, ‘Introduction’ 2007 (n. 5), 6–7.
7 Orford, Anne. ‘The Past as Law or History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern
International Law’. NYU ILJ Working Paper 2 (2012), 1–17, 9.
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of permissible legal arguments,8 there is nevertheless a continuing concern to
integrate their historical writings into the traditional forms of international
legal argument, for example by opening up the sources doctrine to more di-
verse ends.9 For this strand of scholarship, then, critical histories must affect
the moves we can make within the argumentative practice of international
law in order to be normatively significant.
Contrasting with this ‘juridical’ strand of theorizing the normative signifi-
cance of critical histories for international law, there is also a growing emphasis
on less legalistic ‘uses and abuses’10 of historiography. In particular, scholars
who identify with the tradition of Foucauldian genealogy have highlighted the
emancipatory potential of historical explanations. Genealogy may show us, in
Foucault’s words, that ‘what exists is far from filling all possible spaces’.11 As
Kate Purcell has recently argued, this type of critical history may thus be ther-
apeutic by showing us that our ‘ways of understanding and engaging with the
world . . . are unnecessarily and even dangerously constrained, in part by ex-
posing those constraints as both unnecessary and dangerous’.12 For this strand
of thought, the writing of critical histories of international law should eman-
cipate itself from the requirement to provide ‘judgment based on normative
8 Craven, ‘Introduction’ 2007 (n. 5), 9.
9 Arvidsson, Matilda and Miriam Bak McKenna. ‘The Turn to History in International Law
and the Sources Doctrine: Critical Approaches and Methodological Imaginaries’. Leiden
Journal of International Law 33(1) (2020), 37–56, 38.
10 The phrase originally stems from Nietzsche, one of the central figures for the genealogical
tradition. See the second essay of Nietzsche, Friedrich. Untimely Meditations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also Foucault, Michel. ‘Nietzsche, la généalogie,
l’histoire’. InHommage à Jean Hyppolite, ed. Suzanne Bachelard (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1971), 145–172.
11 Foucault, Michel. ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’. In Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential
Works of Foucaualt, 1954–1984, Vol. 1), ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997),
135–140, 140. For discussion, see Lorenzini, Daniele. ‘Genealogy and Critique in Foucault
and Fricker’.TheMonist 105(4) (2022).
12 Purcell, Kate. ‘On the Uses and Advantages of Genealogy for International Law’. Leiden
Journal of International Law 33(1) (2020), 13–35, 14.
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criteria’.13 Instead of seeking to allow us to judge and provide normative guid-
ance, a critical history may also seek to problematize by calling ‘into question
the “constellations of power” or “collection of ideas on display” to which judg-
ment would simply have recourse’.14 But such genealogical approaches have
tended to shy away from claiming normative significance for their historiogra-
phy, preferring to emphasise ambiguity and leave the normative upshot open,
as something for the reader to determine.
We develop a sense of normative significance that aims to occupy amiddle-
ground between these two approaches. While we reject the ‘juridical’ picture
that identifies the normative significance of critical histories with their im-
mediate significance for international legal arguments, we also reject the
Foucauldian picture of genealogical histories as pure problematizations that
merely highlight new possibilities and refrain from claiming any clear norma-
tive upshot. Even where a critical history merely problematizes its object, the
question remains why it manages to problematize—why the revelation of con-
tingency should be seen as a problematization of international law; for even
problematizations depend on prior assumptions (such as the belief that the
present state of international law reflects some sort of teleological necessity).
Historiography that gives us reason to question these assumptions thereby
evinces a form of normative significance that itself stands in need of further
elucidation.15
13 Ibid., at 32 [emphasis in the original].
14 Ibid., at 32, quoting Butler, Judith. ‘What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue’. In
The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy ed. David Ingram (Malden and Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002), 212–228, 212. For illuminating overviews of various uses of genealogy, see
also Owen,David. ‘Genealogy’. In Encyclopedia of PoliticalTheory, ed. Mark Bevir (Thousand
Oaks: Sage Publications, 2010), 549–551; Srinivasan, Amia. ‘Genealogy, Epistemology and
Worldmaking’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CXIX(2) (2019), 127–156.
15 As we will explain in more detail in the next section, while it has often been noted that
critical histories are important because they undermine more traditional evolutionary
histories of international law, the normative significance of undermining these evolutionary
narratives by way of critical histories has not yet been elucidated by the kind of theoretical
account we provide here. That is, other scholars have noted that the fact that these critical
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The key to understanding this and related forms of normative significance,
we suggest, is to consider them from the point of view of the general reader
of such histories, and in particular in relation to what the reader brings to
such histories. Much theoretical reflection on critical histories has focused on
providing guidance for how to write critical histories—notably by flagging
the danger of ‘anachronism’.16 We propose to shift the focus of the debate
from an author-centred to an audience-centred approach: our question is not
how to write critical histories, but how to react to them.17 What we seek to
characterize is how not just international lawyers, but people at large should
react to certain kinds of unflattering histories of international law: how these
histories should affect people’s attitudes towards international law given their
present-day concerns.18 But, in line with our audience-centered approach, we
histories undermine evolutionary histories is normatively significant, but they have not
really explained why it can be so.
16 On the issue of ‘anachronism’ in particular, see Hunter, Ian. ‘Global Justice and Regional
Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law ofNature andNations’. In Law and Politics in
British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire, eds. Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter:
Springer, 2010), 11–29, 11–13, 20, 24; Orford, Anne. ‘On International Legal Method’. London
Review of International Law 1(1) (2013), 166-197, 170–177; Koskenniemi, Martti. ‘Vitoria
and Us: Thoughts on Critical Histories of International Law’. Rechtsgeschichte-Legal History
22 (2014), 119-138, 122–123. On author-centered approaches more generally, see also Bell,
Duncan. ‘Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond’. International Affairs 85(1)
(2009), 3–22; Moyn, Samuel. ‘Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography
of Human Rights’. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 8 (2012), 123–140; Altwicker,
Tilmann and Oliver Diggelmann. ‘How is Progress Constructed in International Legal
Scholarship?’. European Journal of International Law 25(2) (2014), 425–444.
17 The relevant sense of audience is not restricted to the group of people who will actually read
these critical histories; nor is it restricted to the group of people that are explicitly addressed
in the text. To use an illustrative example from political theory: Machiavelli’sThe Prince
purports to provide instruction to a prince and was actually mostly read by other scholars,
but his intended audience was clearly the populace at large. Similarly, while the actual
readership of many critical histories may be small and they are often addressed to members
of specific academic disciplines, their audience in the relevant sense may nevertheless be a
lot larger, such as all the people who have overt and covert conceptions of the history of
international law. See Section III below.
18 Our treatment here partially coincides with the literature on ‘presentism’, see the points of
contention between Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics’ 2010 (n. 16), and
Orford, Anne. ‘International Law and the Limits of History’. InThe Law of International
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do not so much defend the role of present-day concerns in writing critical
histories as chart the normative implications of present-day concerns for
how to react to them. What is distinctive about our approach is thus that we
harness ideas from philosophy to develop an audience-centred understanding
of the normative significance of critical histories for international law that is
broader than the ‘juridical’ conception and more normatively ambitious than
the Foucauldian ‘genealogical’ conception.
In particular, we offer what Ludwig Wittgenstein called an übersichtliche
Darstellung—a surveyable or perspicuous representation19—of three notable
ways in which critical histories can be normatively significant for those who
read them:
(i) by undermining the overt or covert conceptions of history embedded
within present practices in support of their authority;
(ii) by disappointing the normative expectations that regulate people’s reac-
tions to critical histories;
(iii) by revealing continuities and discontinuities in the functions that ideas,
practices, or institutions serve.
This tripartite distinction is, inevitably, a simplifying model, but simplifica-
tion and idealization can be of help in thinking clearly about the normative
significance of critical histories. As Wittgenstein suggested in advocating the
use of surveyable representations, one form of intellectual advance consists
in achieving a clear overview and a firm analytical and theoretical grasp of
something elusively complex, in coming to know one’s way about—in this in-
stance, in the tangle of ways in which critical histories can affect how we think
Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi, eds. Werner Wouter, Marieke de Hoon, and Alexis
Galán (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 297–320.
19 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations (Chich-
ester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009 [1953]), §122.
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normatively about international law.20 Of course, the tripartite distinction
in itself is abstract enough to be applicable to more than just critical interna-
tional legal histories. We thus apply to international law a distinction which
might also be fruitfully applied elsewhere. In elaborating the distinction in
the next three sections, we first articulate each of the three strands of norma-
tive significance in general terms before illustrating what form it takes in the
particular context of the history of international law.
III. Undermining Overt and Covert Conceptions of History
Critical histories can undermine received conceptions of the past. But how
can the fact that historiography puts pressure on received conceptions of the
past then exert critical power and be normatively significant beyond the way
in which it unsettles beliefs about history?
Even if we start from the assumption that the history of international
law is not in itself normatively significant, the past can acquire normative
significance when present-day conceptions of the past are put in the service of
normative claims to authority or legitimacy. Authority for religious or political
views, for example, is often claimed by conceiving of their history in a certain
way. Where this is the case, it renders those views vulnerable to having their
justifications undercut by truthful historical inquiry.
Conceptions of the past that support normative claims to authority or le-
gitimacy are more widespread than onemight think. For alongside the various
ways in which claims to authority or legitimacy can rest on overt conceptions
of the past, there are also various covert ways in which descriptions of present
practices in ostensibly non-historical terms can entail certain conceptions of
history. In saying that things happened a certain way, one commits oneself to
more than the literal content of what one said; one also undertakes commit-
20 Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen 2009 (n. 19), §§122–23.
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ments about the presuppositions and implications of saying it, commitments
which may themselves involve particular conceptions of history. And each of
these commitments will in turn be vulnerable to subversion through truth-
ful historical inquiry. This is a point which the liberal philosopher Bernard
Williams presses against those who maintain that ‘the values of contempo-
rary liberalism cannot possibly be criticized in terms of their history’. On
Williams’s view, many advocates of the values of contemporary liberalism ren-
der themselves vulnerable to critical histories because they often conceive of
these values in terms that either overtly maintain or more covertly presuppose
or imply that ‘they have emerged from the spread of reason and represent a
cognitive achievement’.21
Similarly, insofar as the present-day practice of international law claims
authority for itself in terms of certain conceptions of history, undermining
these conceptions of history can undermine the rational basis for a contin-
uing concern with the practice. And since international law relies on such
conceptions of history to a greater extent than other branches of law, this helps
explain how critical histories of international law can exert critical power
beyond what they tell us about history.
In international law, the conceptions that are most susceptible to being
undermined by critical histories are conceptions of international law’s history
as a history of progress.22 There are two main forms that these conceptions
take. The first is the conception of international law as constitutive of progress:
21 Williams, Bernard. ‘Why Philosophy Needs History’. In Essays and Reviews 1959–2002, ed.
Michael Woods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 405–412, 410. For a history
of liberalism that contrasts with the spread-of-reason account of it, see Bell, Reordering the
World 2016 (n. 1); Pitts, A Turn to Empire 2009 (n. 1).
22 For the argument that much writing in international law still exhibits a commitment to a
history of progress, see Altwicker and Diggelmann, ‘How is Progress Constructed’ 2014
(n. 16). For an example of the type of response given by the targets of such allegations,
see Howse, Robert and Ruti Teitel. ‘Does Humanity-Law Require (or Imply) a Progressive
Theory or History? (And Other Questions for Martti Koskenniemi)’. Temple International
and Comparative Law Journal 27 (2013), 377.
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on this picture, international law simply is the slow unfolding of reason, the
gradual realization of a set of rational principles. As Martti Koskenniemi has
remarked, ‘most histories of international law were written as evolutionary
narratives about jurists and philosophers carrying out a transhistorical con-
versation contributing to the ever fuller realization of “great principles”’ and
exploration of ‘perpetual themes extending from the origins of Western politi-
cal thinking in Greek and Roman antiquity to the present’.23 These progressive
or Whiggish views are no doubt less dominant now than they were in past.24
Yet they remain prominent in textbook narratives even today. These textbook
narratives do not just involve explicit descriptions of key historical events,
but also paint a picture of international law as a continuing transhistorical
conversation.25
This idea that international law is constitutively progressive is susceptible
to being undermined by critical histories, for, at least on some understand-
ings of ‘transhistorical conversation’, the history of international law can only
be seen as such a conversation if earlier contributors shared with later contrib-
utors a sense of what the conversation was about, and what forms and stan-
dards of arguments were acceptable.26 It is this shared frame of reference—this
shared sense of what is at issue and what counts as a good argument—that al-
23 Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us’ 2014 (n. 16), 120.
24 Cf. Nys, Ernest. Les origines du droit international (Brussels: Castaigne, 1894) ; Redslob,
Robert. Histoire des grands principes du droit des gens depuis l’Antiquite jusqu’a la veille de
la grande guerre (Paris: Rousseau, 1923).
25 Koskenniemi, Martti. ‘Foreword: History of Human Rights as a Political Intervention in
the Present’. In Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights eds. Pamela Slotte and Miia Halme-
Tuomisaari (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), ix–xviii, ix.
26 Strictly speaking, this formulation remains ambiguous between a weaker and a stronger re-
quirement.The weaker requirement is one for whatmight be called ‘non-transitive progress’:
it demands only that the earlier conversant A and the later conversant B share a frame of
reference while the conversant B and the even later conversant C share a frame of reference,
but not that A and C share one. The stronger requirement is one for ‘transitive progress’: it
demands in addition that A and C share a frame of reference as well. We take it that progres-
sive views of international law typically claim that there is progress in the stronger, transitive
sense.
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lows later views to appear as advances over earlier views, as having won an
argument, and thus as instantiating the spread of reason.27 But one thing that
critical histories tend to show—in addition to the contingency, incoherence,
and self-interested nature of much international legal thought—is that the
historical changes involved were simply too radical for there to have been
the kinds of enduring standards and concerns that would allow us to con-
ceive of the history of international law as a transhistorical conversation about
perpetual themes.28
The second form that histories of progress take involves conceiving of
international law as instrumental to progress. These conceptions of interna-
tional law as instrumentally progressive entail commitments regarding the
effects of international law in the course of its history: they present interna-
tional law as having been a force for good, either always or on balance. In
1908, for example, the German jurist Lassa Oppenheim still had high hopes
that a ‘master-builder’ would soon come along and recount the history of in-
ternational law as ‘a branch of the history of Western civilization’ culminating
in the ‘ultimate victory of international law over international anarchy’.29 Op-
penheim had no doubt that this history was going to vindicate international
law as a force for peace and prosperity in international relations.
As is well-known to people who specialize in writing the history of in-
ternational law, that master-builder of course never arrived.30 But as Randall
Lesaffer emphasizes, the narrative of international law’s victory over inter-
27 See Williams, Bernard. ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline’. In Philosophy as a Humanis-
tic Discipline, ed. AdrianWilliamMoore (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2006), 180–199, 189–191; Williams, ‘The Last Word, byThomas Nagel’. In Essays and Reviews
1959–2002, ed. Michael Woods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 371–387, 385;
Williams, ‘Why Philosophy Needs History’ 2014 (n. 21), 410.
28 See Skinner, Quentin. ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’. History and
Theory 8 (1969), 3–53.
29 Oppenheim, Lassa. ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’. American
Journal of International Law 2 (1908), 313–356, 317.
30 Compare Craven, ‘Introduction’ 2007 (n. 5), 2. There were of course histories in the realist
style of Grewe, Wilhelm.The Epochs of International Law (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001). But
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national anarchy continues to have broad purchase today.31 Insofar as that
narrative is still part of the disciplinary imagination, it too survives most ex-
plicitly in textbooks initiating students into the discipline. Yet non-specialists
also have views about the instrumental historical role of international law, even
if these only consist of ‘broad and vague assumptions’32 about the long-term
effects of key events, such as the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 or the founding
of the United Nations.
Given the prevalence of such conceptions of international law as instru-
mentally progressive, it is no surprise thatmany critical histories exert pressure
on the contemporary practice of international law by painting its history as
being, in Nathaniel Berman’s phrase, ‘pockmarked by a series of catastrophes
and mutations’ and ‘rocked by the countless forms of colonial conquest and
anti-colonial resistance’.33 Conceptions of international law as instrumentally
progressive have been challenged by numerous historical accounts reveal-
ing international law to have been deeply implicated in past atrocities. For
example, Jörg Fisch studied the many ways in which international law regu-
lated and perpetuated colonial relations,34 while Sundhya Pahuja questioned
whether the years after 1945 saw a true universalization of international law.35
Another potentially unsettling finding for those who thought of international
law as a force for good was Antony Anghie’s presentation of the history of in-
ternational law as a never-ending story of colonial domination starting with
while this book was sweeping in scope, it was still nothing like the scholarly vindication of
the grand narrative that Oppenheim had in mind.
31 Lesaffer, Randall. ‘International Law and its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love’. In
Time,History and International Law, eds. Matthew Craven,Malgosia Fitzmaurice, andMaria
Vogiatzi (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 27–41, 34.
32 Lesaffer, ‘International Law and its History’ 2007 (n. 31), 34.
33 Berman, Nathaniel. Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and International
Law (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 44.
34 Fisch, Jörg.Die Europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht:Die Auseinandersetzung um den
Status der überseeischen Gebiete vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Steiner,
1984).
35 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law 2011 (n. 1).
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Francisco de Vitoria.36 This threatened to undermine the justification for
many versions of the instrumentally progressive view.37
This first branch of the tripartite distinction, then, depends on our now
describing and claiming authority for our practices in terms that overtly or
covertly conceive of history as being a certain way. In the examples we con-
sidered, thinking of international law as constitutively or instrumentally pro-
gressive already conceives of history in a certain way. Other examples include
conceptions of human rights as something inevitable, which also carries his-
torical implications that truthful historiography might undermine. As Samuel
Moyn’s history of human rights shows, driving ideas behind human rights,
such as that of a shared humanity, do not render the modern understanding of
human rights from the 1970s onwards inevitable; rather, they leave concrete le-
gal questions so open that almost anything—including Stoicism, Christianity,
and the advent of human rights as tools for piercing the veil of sovereignty—is
compatible with them.38 To explain why human rights came to be understood
as they now are, one has to draw on far more contingent factors, such as a
general dissatisfaction with the internal performance of new states that were
granted sovereignty during the process of decolonization, as well as the state
of American domestic politics around that time. Such a critical history does
not necessarily undermine the idea of human rights as such; but it carries
normative significance insofar as it casts aspersions on one dominant justifi-
36 Anghie, Imperialism 2005 (n. 1), 13–21. Much the same point could again be made with
reference to Hugo Grotius, the other main candidate for the title of ‘founding father’ of
international law. Tuck, Richard.The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the
International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 78–108.
37 See Brown, James Scott.The Spanish Origins of International law: Lectures on Francisco de
Vitoria (1480–1546) and Francisco Sua rez (1548–1617) (Washington: Georgetown University,
1928).
38 See Moyn,The Last Utopia 2012 (n. 1), at 9–10, 15–17, 39, 69. For a discussion of the norma-
tive significance of Moyn’s contribution to the history of human rights, see Alston, Philip.
‘Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights’. Harvard Law Review 126 (2013),
2043–2081; McCrudden, Christopher. ‘Human Rights Histories’. Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 35(1) (2014), 179–212.
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cation for human rights, namely their inevitability given ideas such as that of
a shared humanity.
We do not want to suggest that the contextualist way of writing history
favoured by critical historians like Moyn is the only legitimate one.39 There
is a place for truthful tellings of history that work with grand narratives and
foreshadowings; the point is that even if they do not profess to tell the one
and only truth, they must still be truthful narratives, and that can be a fierce
constraint—both on historians that seek to proffer truths and on the society
that lets them. There are claims about the past that history will simply not
bear out.40 As the French Prime Minister Clemenceau is said to have retorted
at Versailles to a German wondering what historians would later write about
WWI: ‘They won’t say that Belgium invaded Germany’.41
As emerged already in this brief discussion, more conceptions of the past
are woven into our present practices than meet the eye. Insofar as critical his-
tories contradict or undermine these conceptions, they will exert pressure not
just on these conceptions, but also on the claims to authority or legitimacy
that rest on them. In its claims to authority, international law relies to a con-
siderable extent on certain conceptions of its own history, and the more it
does so, the more there is a question whether these conceptions are stable un-
der historical reflection or risk being undermined by it. Where they prove
unstable under reflection, we might see whether we can replace them with
39 For a critical discussion of contextualist histories that questions whether their delineation of
contexts is the only respectable one, see Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us’ 2014 (n. 16), at 123–9.
See also LaCapra, Dominick. Soundings in Critical Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 203.
40 See for example Diggelmann, Oliver. ‘“The Internationalists” as Grand Narrative: Key Ele-
ments and Dilemmata’. Global Constitutionalism 7(3) (2018), 297–314, 298–304, criticizing
the grand narrative of Hathaway, Oona and Scott Shapiro.The Internationalists:How a Radi-
cal Plan to OutlawWar Remade theWorld (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 2017) by pointing
to the many historical facts that stand in tension with it, all the while acknowledging the
general legitimacy of attempts to tell such grand narratives.
41 SeeWilliams, Bernard. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002), 243.
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conceptions that are less vulnerable to critical history. This is what Bernard
Williams proposed to do by replacing the progressive historical narratives told
to vindicate liberalism with a narrative that makes fewer presuppositions vul-
nerable to being debunked by truthful historical inquiry.42 In much the same
way, one can seek conceptions of international law’s history that are stable
under reflection and can provide a robust basis for its claims to authority.
IV. Disappointing Normative Expectations
Often, people neither overtly nor covertly conceive of history as being a cer-
tain way at all; yet history can retain its normative significance even then.
Many experience as subversive the revelation that a certain practice or insti-
tution has a tainted history—that its historical roots are stained with blood,
violence, and oppression, for instance—even without previously having had
any very determinate views as to what that history looks like. One might have
professed oneself ignorant on the matter if asked, and yet one’s confidence in
the institution is undermined once that history comes to light. How is this
possible?
The answer—and this brings us to the second branch of the tripartite
distinction—is that history is told not just about the past, but to people, and
these people have certain normative expectations regarding the kind of history
that something can properly have which critical histories may disappoint.
While empirical expectations concern how things in fact behave, normative
expectations concern how they ought to behave.These normative expectations
are not conceptions of history, because they are often inchoate andnot directed
at particular objects at all; but they nonetheless shape people’s reactions to
history by determining how much entanglement with contingencies, lowly
42 See Williams, Bernard. ‘The Liberalism of Fear’. In In the Beginning Was the Deed: Real-
ism and Moralism in Political Argument, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorne (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2005), 52–61.
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interests, and other unflattering aspects they are prepared to tolerate before
feeling alienated from something. They regulate what kind of history people
treat as being compatible with having a high normative status.
Normative expectations are not necessarily something that one con-
sciously adopts or is aware of. They manifest themselves in one’s dispositions
to react to historical findings. It is through one’s reactions, particularly in treat-
ing the revelation of a practice’s origins as delegitimating it, that one endorses
certain patterns of reasoning, certain sets of proprieties governing what infer-
ences it is proper to draw from historical observations: the inference from a
practice’s meriting confidence and respect to its having high-minded origins,
or the inference from its failing to have high-minded origins to its failing to
merit confidence and respect.
For example, most people do not have very determinate views about the
role of Francisco de Vitoria within the history of international law. But they
do have normative expectations of a highly general kind that determine how
tainted the history of respected ideas and institutions can turn out to be before
they lose their respect for them.When these normative expectations are of the
highly purist kind that leads one to treat even a distant entanglementwith lowly
motives or problematic effects as a disappointment, this can render critical
histories of international law, such as Antony Anghie’s portrayal of Vitoria,
rather unsettling.43 If Anghie is right, international law was entangled with
the justification of colonial domination already in the hands of its founding
figures. To someone with high normative expectations, this will come as a
significant disappointment.
As this example also brings out, this kind of normative significance de-
pends on how demanding our normative expectations are, and one question
43 We discuss this purist attitude according to which the highly respected must have cor-
respondingly respectable origins in Queloz, Matthieu and Damian Cueni. ‘Nietzsche as
a Critic of Genealogical Debunking: Making Room for Naturalism Without Subversion’.
TheMonist 102(3) (2019), 277–297. For a philosophical critique of this purist attitude, see
Williams, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), ch. 10.
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that readers of critical histories must ask themselves is when these expec-
tations are in fact too high. If one thought that the standing of institutions
enabling international cooperation would be terminally impugned by the re-
alization that they historically grew out of the pursuit of national interests,
for example, one would experience as subversive even John Ikenberry’s find-
ing that the liberal order since WWII was both driven by US interests and
beneficial to all in some respects.44 By contrast, a more moderate attitude ac-
cording to which the standing of some form of international cooperation is
impugned only if it is exclusively or almost exclusively in the interest of a dom-
inant player is far more tolerant of entanglement with national interests. The
fact that people have in the past sought to use international law for their own
ends is doubtless worth highlighting, and, especially when these ends are not
ours, it can seem like the fact about international cooperation. But this fact
should not blind us to others, such as the concomitant benefits of those uses.
And certainly, our normative expectations should not be such that this fact, all
by itself, leads us to conclude that the entire international order is in decline.
The history of the United Nations offers another example. As Mark Ma-
zower highlights, the United Nations are often judged, in the words of former
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, against ‘the lofty goals . . . originally envis-
aged by the charter’.45 Far from simply expressing a commitment to universal
values such as human rights, however, the United Nations have, from their
earliest beginnings, been used by dominant states to further their own domes-
tic cause, and it is illuminating to study the ideologies that led various powers
to define their interests as they did.46 How should one react to the revelation
that the United Nations were originally envisioned to protect the interests
of empire? On Mazower’s view, the common reaction that treats this revela-
44 Ikenberry,G John. Liberal Leviathan:TheOrigins,Crisis,and Transformation of theAmerican
World Order: Princeton University Press, 2011), xi, 10.
45 Mazower, Mark. No Enchanted Palace:The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the
United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4.
46 Ibid., at 10, 14.
19 • Damian Cueni and Matthieu Queloz
tion as subversive matches the tendency of many ‘historians [of the United
Nations to] confuse the utopianism of their subject with their own’.47 The
looming problem is that if one’s normative expectations become too demand-
ing or ‘utopian’, this can make a universal acid of historical inquiry. If one’s
normative expectations are such that one would lose faith in any institution
that depended on tainted money at any point in its history, for example, this,
in conjunction with the historical fact of colonialism, renders one’s faith in a
great many institutions vulnerable to being shaken by historical inquiry. One
need not be a pessimist of the bleakest sort to believe that enough digging will
unearth a shameful story nearly everywhere. As Nietzsche somewhat hyper-
bolically observed, all good things come from bad things, and this need mean
no more than that great creativity often grew out of great suffering, that hu-
manity’s greatest achievements are often inextricably entangled with its least
glorious moments, and that most venerable practices and institutions could
not have been established or upheld without some coercion and bloodshed
along the way.48
Once normative expectations exceed a certain threshold, therefore, the
standing of nearly every practice is bound to be impugnedby truthful historical
inquiry, and the critical edge of history is blunted as a result: history becomes
indiscriminately subversive. This means that if historiography is to retain its
capacity to help readers of history discriminate between practices—to teach us
differences, as King Lear put it—those readers’ normative expectations must
not be so high as to render history indiscriminately subversive. How high is
too high will depend on what the history of our practices and institutions
actually looks like. What we should normatively expect history to look like
cannot be entirely independent of what we in fact know it to be.
47 Ibid., at 6.
48 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
3.9. See also Williams, Bernard. ‘Nietzsche: The Gay Science’. In Introductions to Nietzsche,
ed. Robert B. Pippin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 137–151, 143.
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This second kind of normative significance thus turns not on the concep-
tions of history themselves, but on the normative expectations with which
people encounter particular conceptions or descriptions of history. How we
react to historiography—whether we experience it as vindicatory, neutral, or
subversive—of course depends on a variety of factors, including notably the
substantive details of what is revealed, how far back the events in question lie,
and on how closely these past events are taken to constrain or inform what
now goes on. But our reaction also depends on the often unexamined norma-
tive expectations about the kind of history we are prepared to accept for given
practices while retaining our confidence in them.49
V. Revealing Functional Continuity and Discontinuity
The third kind of normative significance derives from the continuities and
discontinuities in the functions which history reveals practices to perform.
Practices can serve a variety of needs and purposes which are often not trans-
parent to those who engage in them. Learning that a practice continues to
serve a function one does not want to see discharged, or that it has ceased to
serve a function one does want to see discharged, can have a subversive effect:
it can weaken one’s confidence in the practice or encourage one to move away
from it. Accordingly, history can be normatively significant by bringing to
light functional continuities and discontinuities, and many critical historians
turn to the past precisely to that end.50 Emmanuelle Jouannet, for example,
uses history to identify the present purpose of international law.51 Finding that
49 For a discussion of the idea that histories can be vindicatory, neutral, or subversive, see
Craig, Edward. ‘Genealogies and the State of Nature’. In Bernard Williams, ed. AlanThomas
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 181–200.
50 For a sympathetic critique of the ‘functionalist’ strand in the development of critical legal
histories, see Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’ 1984 (n. 5).
51 Jouannet, Emmanuelle.The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ch. 9. Jouannet identifies the function
of international law by pointing to the function that writers like Emer de Vattel intended it to
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international law initially served to replace religion in ensuring the proper
ordering of mankind, she argues from this historical finding to a view of con-
temporary international law as a liberal-welfarist body of law that remains
driven by this twofold initial purpose.52 The normative significance of this
kind of historical account lies in the conclusions it yields about the functions
that practices continue to perform.
Of course, insofar as international law (or some particular institution or
norm within international law) is conceived as continuously serving a certain
function, the use of history to reveal functional continuities anddiscontinuities
will carry a variant of the kind of normative significance we considered in
section III: the critique of certain conceptions of historical functions is a species
of the critique of certain conceptions of history. But revealing functional
continuities and discontinuities can exert critical power even in the absence of
any such antecedent conceptions. To understand that something performs
a certain function is to understand that it systematically has certain causal
effects one cares about, either because those effects serve needs and concerns
one wants to see satisfied, or because these effects are oppressive or unjust.
Revealing functional continuities and discontinuities through critical
histories can be normatively significant in two ways. First, it can show that
changes in circumstances have robbed a practice of its functionality. Even
if the common narrative that presents sovereignty as a source of peace and
stability within seventeenth-century Europe is true, for example, this does
not mean that the advent of sovereignty everywhere and always heralds a
turn towards more peaceful relations—Anghie, for one, has forcefully made
the case for functional discontinuity once sovereignty was expanded beyond
have. But of course, we can also look beyond what authors at particular times intended, and
we have to be mindful of the fact that even if something originally served a certain function,
it does not necessarily follow that it still does, for the conditions relative to which it originally
functioned may no longer obtain. For inferences from past to current functionality to be
plausible, we need some reason to think that the conditions in question still obtain.
52 Ibid., 5–8.
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Europe.53 If the conditions relative to which something originally proved
functional change, its function might change with them.
The second way in which history can be normatively significant when
functional continuity is lacking is by attuning one to new but related patterns
of functionality. Being attentive to how practices proved open to being used
and abused in various ways in the past, and to the subtle patterns in which they
might have beneficial or pernicious effects, sharpens one’s eye and judgment.
It fuels and refines one’s ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ by cultivating alertness to
potential abuse through awareness of past abuse.54 More generally, it gives one
a sense of the functional openness of a practice: the degree to which it lends
itself to a variety of ends. Practices that arose to serve one purpose can be
repurposed—what was used for good can be used for ill. But not all practices
lend themselves to such repurposing to the same degree—they might exhibit
functional inertia. History gives us a sharp sense of what purposes practices
can be put to, and risk being put to, by showing us what purposes they have
been put to in the past.
Of course, functional historical critique can alert us not just to what is
bad about a practice, but also to what is good about it. When practices are
as history-laden as those of international law, nuanced historical scrutiny
will typically uncover a plurality of functions in any given practice. Among
these functions may be genuinely valuable contributions which we would be
ill-advised to renounce. If we are to revise our practices responsibly, we should
not miss the achievements for the problems. Sovereignty, for example, for all
its flaws, arguably also continues to perform valuable functions of ensuring
peace and stability in most contexts. A nuanced historical critique will lead
53 Anghie, Imperialism 2005 (n. 1), 5–7, and in more detail at 196–244.
54 Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1970), 32. For discussion, see Gadamer, Hans-Georg. ‘The Hermeneu-
tics of Suspicion’.Man and World 17(3) (1984), 313–323, 10.1007/bf01250456; Leiter, Brian.
‘The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud’. InThe Future for
Philosophy, ed. Brian Leiter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 74–105.
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one to see both what needs changing and what needs preserving, and thereby
help one understand, not just that a practice must be changed, but also where
and how.
Building on the work of Anghie,55 Sundhya Pahuja has argued that while
the process of decolonization brought real change—the promise of better-
ment through the universalization of legal doctrines such as sovereignty and
self-determination—that promise continued to be undermined by powerful
functions of practices that ostensibly served quite different ends.56 To sup-
port this claim of functional continuity, Pahuja examines three instances in
which the third world tried to use international law to challenge the hege-
monic position of the West: the process of decolonization, the establishment
of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and the assertion of a rule
of international law after the end of the Cold War.57 In all three instances,
the new promise of universality masked a strong functional continuity with
colonial power relations. Pahuja’s critique is helpfully seen through a distinc-
tion—introduced by the philosopher Sally Haslanger—betweenmanifest and
operative concepts.58 Manifest concepts are the explicit, public, and intuitive
understandings of what we are doing, while operative concepts are the implicit
55 See Anghie, Imperialism 2005 (n. 1), ch. 4 and 5.
56 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law 2011 (n. 1), 3–4. Her argument that colonialism
reproduced itself by shifting power from the political to the economic sphere has been one of
the animating insights behind critiques of neo-colonialism since Sartre, Jean-Paul. Situations,
V, Colonialisme et néo-colonialisme (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) and Nkrumah, Kwame. Neo-
Colonialism:The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd, 1965).
57 What Pahuja thereby also does, of course, is to make effective use of what Quintilian calls
paradiastolic redescription: the technique of ‘replacing a given evaluative description with
a rival term that serves to picture the action no less plausibly, but serves at the same time
to place it in a contrasting moral light’. Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics, Volume I:
Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 183. But the full critical
force of her enterprise really comes out only once we see it as a functional critique, and
more specifically as a functional critique identifying the operative functions performed by
practices ostensibly serving quite different ends.
58 See Haslanger, Sally. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 370. Thus, an analysis of personhood that takes into account
the social matrix in which the concept in fact operates might reveal, for example, that ‘all
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and hidden understandings of how our practices actually function. The prime
way of identifying operative concepts, Haslanger suggests, is through histori-
cal inquiry—not out of sheer fascination with history, but because ‘there is
often a significant gap between the dominant or institutional understanding
of a domain and its actual workings’,59 and because its actual workings are
so deeply intertwined with complex and historically evolving practices that
a historical perspective is required to fully grasp operative concepts. Thus,
when Pahuja claims that post-WWII international law has both an impe-
rial and a counter-imperial dimension,60 she highlights that it includes the
promise of betterment at the manifest level only for that promise to be sti-
fled by functional continuity at the operative level. While the universalization
of international law promised to extend to the third world all the benefits of
sovereignty previously reserved for Western states—such as stability and po-
litical independence—the operative functionality of the international system
continued to perpetuate the hegemonic position of the West.
The fact that international law should in principle have an emancipatory
effect of course remains important for understanding why people retain faith
in international law and how it can have the effects it has: were international
law manifestly unjust, it could no longer have these same effects. Even if
the contribution of the manifest function of international law is to mask its
operative function—to wit, the promotion of Western interests—it has to
provide people with some reason to think that international law performs the
manifest function.61 But it is equally important to grasp that there is a strong
persons are equal, but only white males are persons’. Mills, Charles W. Blackness Visible:
Essays on Philosophy and Race (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 70.
59 Haslanger, Resisting Reality 2012 (n. 58), 368.
60 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law 2011 (n. 1), 41–3.
61 For a discussion of this last point, seeWaldron’s interpretation of E. P.Thompson inWaldron,
Jeremy.The Law (London: Routledge, 1990), 21–24. AsThompson famously puts it: ‘If the
law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimise nothing, contribute
nothing to any class’s hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in
its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation
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correlation between the implementation of that practice and the production
of these effects, even if these effects really are unintended. This alerts one to
the risk of reproducing similar functional patterns going forward. Historical
critique can sharpen one’s critical judgment by rendering one sensitive to
functional patterns and to the subtler ways in which manifestly beneficial
practices can have deleterious effects at the operative level.
The third kind of normative significance that critical histories can have
thus lies in the functions and functional patterns that history can bring to
light and that one might otherwise miss. This yields not just a static ascription
of a certain function to a practice, but a dynamic understanding of the needs
and concerns it answers to, and of the circumstances that must concur to
allow the practice to function as it does—circumstances without which it
becomes pointless or even dysfunctional. By revealing these dependencies
as well as continuities and discontinuities of function one was unaware of,
critical histories render one sensitive to the possibilities of use and abuse that
ideas, practices, and institutions carry with them.
VI. Overall Normative Significance
We have highlighted three ways in which critical histories of international law
can be normatively significant: by undermining the overt or covert conceptions
of history embedded within present practices in support of their authority;
by disappointing the normative expectations that regulate people’s reactions
to critical histories; and by revealing continuities and discontinuities in the
functions that our practices serve.
This allows us not only to represent the different kinds of normative pull
we are subject to when confronted with critical histories of international law,
but also to make sense of cases in which the normative significance of one and
and shall seem to be just’. Thompson, Edward Palmer.Whigs and Hunters:The Origin of the
Black Act (London: Penguin, 1975), 263.
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the same critical history pulls in conflicting directions. A practice might turn
out both to involve conceptions of its history that a truthful historiography
might reveal to be mythological, which is a subversive insight, and to perform
a valuable function, which is a vindicatory insight. The ‘Myth of Westphalia’,62
for example, a glorifying conception of sovereignty-based international law’s
origins, can be shown by historical inquiry to be mythological; at the same
time, some historical story along these lines can nonetheless plausibly be
told to vindicate sovereignty-based international law as performing a peace-
securing function under certain conditions.63 While it counts in favour of a
practice if it performs a valuable function, it also speaks against its authority
if it partly rests on conceptions of its own history that do not survive truthful
historical scrutiny. These countervailing reasons produce tensions in one’s
overall attitude towards the practice.
Some of these tensions might be overcome by replacing conceptions of
history that proved unstable under reflection with more robust legitimation
stories. Much as Bernard Williams aspires to replace the self-congratulatory
progressive narrative that liberalism tells about itself with one that is more
stable under critical historical reflection, international lawyers might try to
replace the utopian narratives on which some parts of international law still
base their authority with more reflectively stable accounts of international
law’s various successes and failures.
Other tensions one has to learn to live with by lowering one’s normative
expectations about the kindof history practicesmayproperly have.This iswhat
Nietzsche advocates when he criticizes his nineteenth-century contemporaries
62 For an example of such a critique, see Beaulac, Stéphane. The Power of Language in the
Making of International Law:TheWord Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of
Westphalia (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).
63 For the role of international law’s religious orientation in escalating theThirty Years War,
see Diggelmann, Oliver. ‘Die Entstehung des modernen Völkerrechts in der frühen Neuzeit’.
In Vo lkerrechtsphilosophie der Fru haufkla rung, eds. Tilmann Altwicker, Francis Cheneval,
and Oliver Diggelmann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 1–26, 11–14.
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for having manoeuvred themselves into an impasse by combining a morality
that encourages truthful historical and naturalistic inquiry with overblown
normative expectations that lead them to consider any entanglement of the
highly valued with the lowly world of power struggles, mundane needs, and
historical contingency an insult, something that ‘casts doubt on its value’.64
Similarly, many of us have overly demanding normative expectations about
the kind of history that the ideas, practices, and institutions we respect may
properly have—expectations that an honest look at the history of international
law cannot but disappoint. By adopting more realistic expectations, we can
move away from an attitude that indiscriminately renders any truthful history
subversive, and become able to redraw the contrast between acceptable and
unacceptable histories within the range of histories that international law and
its practices will actually turn out to have.
Finally, one might be able to alleviate tensions by adjusting the functional-
ity of one’s practices, something which can be done not just by tweaking the
practices, but also by tweaking the circumstances in which they operate. Func-
tional historical critique helps us identify the parts of our practices worth
preserving and the parts worth revising—it helps us grasp not just that a prac-
tice must be changed, but where it must be changed. Many of the deleterious
effects of sovereignty in a deeply unjust world might actually be due to the
circumstances in which sovereignty is realized rather than to the sovereignty
norm itself. Instead of sacrificing the many goods that sovereignty provides,
we would then do better to try and tweak the circumstances that affect its
functionality, such as the continual undermining of sovereign equality in the
name of economic gain highlighted in Pahuja’s study.65
64 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
‘“Reason” in Philosophy’, §4. See Queloz, Matthieu and Damian Cueni. ‘Nietzsche as a Critic
of Genealogical Debunking’ (n. 43), 284.
65 For a similar conclusion, see Kingsbury, Benedict. ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’. European
Journal of International Law 9(4) (1998), 599-625, 623–625.
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The countervailing intuitions about the normative significance of critical
histories we started out with are thus the result of real tensions people face in
dealing with the history of their practices, and it is a virtue in a theoretical ac-
count of their normative significance if it can explicitly represent and make
sense of these tensions. In this article, we have sought to achieve this by the-
orizing three different ways in which history can be normatively significant
and call for correspondingly different reactions, inviting people to replace
unstable conceptions of history with more robust ones, lower normative ex-
pectations so that they cease to be indiscriminately subversive, and adjust the
functionality of practices so that they truly serve the ends people want them
to serve.66
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